Defining Islamophobia: Origins, Global Adoption.

Introduction

The term Islamophobia entered public debate in the late 1990s, gaining wide use after the Runnymede Trust’s 1997 report. Since then, it has appeared in resolutions of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and in several United Nations documents. Supporters regard the term as essential for confronting prejudice against Muslims; critics argue that broad or ambiguous definitions may blur the boundary between protecting people and protecting ideas. This article traces the concept’s origin, diffusion, and its implications for free expression and equality law.

1. The Runnymede Trust and the Birth of a Concept

The 1997 Runnymede Trust report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All defined the term as “unfounded hostility towards Islam, and the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities.” It contrasted an “open” view of Islam—seeing it as diverse and dynamic—with a “closed” view that regards Islam as monolithic and threatening. While the report focused on combating prejudice, its wording centred on hostility toward Islam itself, not only toward Muslims, a phrasing that later generated interpretive debate.

2. International Uptake and Institutionalisation

During the 2000s, the OIC adopted Islamophobia as a recurring theme in its communiqués, linking it to hate crimes and negative portrayals of Muslims. OIC members pressed for recognition of Islamophobia at the United Nations. In 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 76/254, designating 15 March as the International Day to Combat Islamophobia. Many governments now collect statistics on anti-Muslim hate crimes, signalling global acknowledgment of the issue.

3. Why the Definition Became Contentious

a. Breadth and Ambiguity

Scholars note that defining Islamophobia as “unfounded hostility towards Islam” can include both discriminatory behaviour toward Muslims and criticism of Islamic doctrines. While protection of individuals aligns with human-rights norms, protection of belief systems can restrict legitimate inquiry. Some academics therefore warn of a “chilling effect”: researchers or students may avoid discussing theology, history, or politics for fear of accusations of Islamophobia.

b. Political Instrumentalisation

Observers caution that governments or political groups could cite Islamophobia to suppress dissent or critique. Others reply that the concern is overstated and that explicit recognition of Islamophobia is essential for addressing systemic bias. Both sides agree that precision and transparency are key to maintaining public trust.

4. Comparison with the Definition of Antisemitism

The IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism describes antisemitism as “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews,” and lists concrete examples. It targets prejudice against an ethno-religious group rather than theological criticism of Judaism. Some Islamophobia definitions, by contrast, concern hostility toward a religion itself. Conflating the two, critics argue, risks legal confusion; supporters counter that both forms of bigotry produce similar harms and deserve explicit recognition.

5. Existing Legal Protections in Democratic States

Most democracies already prohibit religious discrimination and hate crimes:

• United Kingdom: Equality Act 2010 and the Public Order Act 1986 outlaw discrimination and incitement to religious hatred.
• European Union: Directive 2000/78/EC bans discrimination in employment and education.
• United States and Canada: civil-rights and hate-crime statutes protect against religion-based violence and exclusion.

Internationally, Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees freedom of expression, while Article 20(2) prohibits advocacy of religious hatred that incites discrimination or violence. These provisions already balance protection of individuals with open discussion of beliefs. Many legal commentators therefore favour stronger enforcement of existing laws over creating new speech categories.

6. Ongoing Academic and Policy Debate

Debate continues in universities and parliaments. In 2018, the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims proposed a revised definition describing Islamophobia as “a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.” Several local councils adopted it, but the national government withheld endorsement, citing concerns about free speech and legal precision. Some universities also declined formal adoption, preferring to rely on equality and harassment policies already in place.

Surveys by the King’s College London Policy Institute show that many students feel less comfortable discussing religion or politics on campus, suggesting that social pressures—rather than legal rules—may be driving self-censorship.

7. Balancing Protection and Expression

Human-rights frameworks recognise that freedom of religion (Article 9 ECHR) and freedom of expression (Article 10) are complementary. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief recommends addressing hatred by targeting behaviour—violence, discrimination, exclusion—while preserving open debate about ideas. Practical steps include:

• Distinguishing clearly between criticism of belief and abuse of believers.
• Promoting inter-faith education and civic dialogue.
• Maintaining transparent university procedures for investigating harassment.
• Improving data collection on anti-Muslim hate crimes to strengthen law enforcement.

8. Conclusion

The Runnymede Trust’s report transformed public awareness of anti-Muslim prejudice and inspired global recognition through the OIC and UN. Its diffusion also revealed a tension at the heart of liberal democracies: how to protect individuals from discrimination while safeguarding the freedom to examine belief systems. Where the term highlights real hostility toward Muslims, it serves a vital moral function; where it constrains open debate, it risks undermining pluralism. Existing equality and hate-crime laws already prohibit discrimination and incitement; the priority should be fair enforcement, education, and dialogue rather than expanding speech restrictions. If those principles guide policy, societies can combat hatred without compromising freedom of conscience and inquiry.